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Jocelyn Downie* And Miles to Go Before I Sleep: The Future
of End-of-Life Law and Policy in Canada
This paper reviews the legal status of a number of end-of-life law and policy issues
that have, to date, been overshadowed by debates about medical assistance
in dying. It suggests that law reform is needed in relation to palliative sedation
without artificial hydration and nutrition, advance directives for the withholding and
withdrawal of oral hydration and nutrition, unilateral withholding and withdrawal of
potentially life-sustaining treatment, and the determination of death. To leave the
law in its current uncertain state is to leave patients vulnerable to having no access
to interventions that they want or at the other extreme, being forced to receive
interventions that they do not want. This can either inappropriately shorten life or
extend suffering. It can also leave individuals at risk of being declared dead earlier
than appropriate or much-needed organs not being available for transplantation
because individuals are being declared dead later than appropriate.
L'auteure examine le statut juridique denjeux concernant les lois et les politiques
en matiere de fin de vie qui ont, jusqu'a maintenant, 6t6 6clipsbes par les ddbats
sur I'aide mddicale a mourir Elle avance qu'une rdforme du droit s'impose pour
ce qui est de la sedation palliative sans hydratation et nutrition artificielles, des
directives anticipdes concernant I'abstention et linterruption d'hydratation et
de nutrition par voie orale, la poursuite et I'abandon unilatdraux d'un traitement
susceptible de maintenir la vie et la determination de la mort. Laisser la loi dans
son 6tat actuel incertain 6quivaut a laisser les patients vulndrables au manque
d'acces a des interventions qu'ils souhaitent ou, a Iautre extrdme, a les forcer
a subir des interventions dont ils ne veulent pas. L'une ou Iautre situation risque
d'abrdger la vie ou de prolonger la souffrance de fagon inappropride. Elles
peuvent 6galement faire que des personnes a risque soient ddclardes mortes
trop tit ou que des organes fort ndcessaires ne soient pas disponibles pour
transplantation parce que les donneurs potentiels sont declares morts trop tard.
* University Research Professor, Schulich School of Law and Faculty of Medicine, Dalhousie
University; Adjunct Professor, Australian Centre for Health Law Research, QUT; Fellow, Pierre
Elliott Trudeau Foundation. Thanks to Kate Scallion for research assistance on this paper and Richard
Liu for research and discussions on palliative sedation
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II. Advance directives for the withholding and withdrawal of oral
hydration and nutrition





The future of end-of-life law and policy in Canada is a rapidly moving target
because the field is changing so quickly. Indeed, by the time this paper has
been published, parts of it will no doubt be out of date. Nonetheless, as
Canada has just crossed the threshold of the most significant change in
end-of-life law and policy in Canadian history, it is worth spending some
time and effort to map the terrain for the future.
Although the shockwaves caused by the February 2015 Supreme Court
of Canada decision in Carter v Canada (Attorney General)' have largely
died down, the significance of this decision has not. With the coming into
force of the Quebec medical aid in dying legislation (An Act Respecting
End-of-Life Care2 ) and the federal medical assistance in dying legislation
(An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments
to other Acts (medical assistance in dying)3 ), medical assistance in dying
(MAiD) is now legal throughout the country. The task of designing
and implementing the surrounding regulatory framework for the newly
permissive regime is well underway.
It is true that several open questions remain. Specifically, the
government is required by the federal MAiD legislation to
initiate independent reviews of issues relating to requests by mature
minors for medical assistance in dying, to advance requests and to
requests where mental illness is the sole underlying medical condition.'
1. 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331 [Carter 2015].
2. RSQ c S-32.0001.
3. SC 2016 c3 [MAiD legislation].
4. Ibid, s 9.1(1).
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There has also already been a Charter' challenge launched against the
restrictive nature of the federal legislation6 and against the permissive
nature of the Quebec legislation.' There is active litigation on the
issue of a conscientiously objecting physician's duty to refer patients
requesting MAiD.' Some "next gen" MAiD questions will no doubt
anse. For example, should prisoners be allowed access to MAiD? And
should changes be made to legal requirements regarding organ-harvesting
protocols to accommodate the organ donation wishes of individuals who
are accessing MAiD?
However, in this paper I focus on the non-assisted dying issues in the
future of end-of-life law and policy. Now is a good time to turn our attention
from fighting about whether or not to allow MAiD to working together on
finding additional ways for society to better care for the dying. To this end,
four main areas of end-of-life law and policy require attention: palliative
sedation without artificial hydration and nutrition, advance directives for
the withholding and withdrawal of oral hydration and nutrition, unilateral
withholding and withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining treatment, and
determination of death.
I. Palliative sedation without artificial hydration and nutrition
Justice Smith, the trial judge in Carter v. Canada, defined palliative
sedation as
the intentional administration of sedative medication to reduce a patient's
level of consciousness, with the intent to alleviate suffering at the end
of life. It includes both intermittent and continuous sedation, as well
as both superficial and deep sedation. It may be accompanied by the
withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition.'
Inthis paper, I am concerned with a subset ofpalliative sedation, specifically,
deep and continuous palliative sedation combined with the withholding
or withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition (PSsANH).'o There
are three types of this kind of PSiANH. First, where the interventions
clearly play no causal role in the death (when death occurs within one
5. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
6. Lamb v Canada (AG) (27 June 2016), Vancouver, SCBC, S-165851 (notice of civil claim)
[Lamb].
7. See Quebec (Procureur general) vDAmico, 2015 QCCA2138, 2015 CarswellQue 12180.
8. See, e.g., Sean Fine, "Christian Doctors Challenge Ontario's Assisted-Death Referral
Requirement," Globe and Mail (22 June 2016), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/
national/christian-doctors-challenge-ontarios-assisted-death-referral-policy/article30552327/>.
9. Carter v Canada (AG) 2012 BCSC 886, [2012] BCWLD 6899 at para 42 [Carter (Trial)].
10. S is the symbol for "without."
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or two days). Second, where the palliative interventions may, but are not
certain to shorten life (when death occurs within two weeks). Third, where
interventions clearly cause the death (when death would not otherwise
have occurred for many weeks or even months).
1. Types one and two PSTANH
If someone were charged with a criminal offence in connection with the
first type of PSsANH there would arguably be no liability-the conduct is
legal as the first type clearly does not cause death.
The law on the second type is somewhat less clear-there are some
statements from courts that might be taken to mean that it is (or may be)
legal. For example, in Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General)
Sopinka J. writing for the majority said:
The fact that doctors may deliver palliative care to terminally ill patients
without fear of sanction, it is argued, attenuates to an even greater
degree any legitimate distinction which can be drawn between assisted
suicide and what are currently acceptable forms of medical treatment.
The administration of drugs designed for pain control in dosages which
the physician knows will hasten death constitutes active contribution
to death by any standard. However, the distinction dmwn here is one
based upon intention-in the case of palliative care the intention is to
ease pain, which has the effect of hastening death, while in the case of
assisted suicide, the intention is undeniably to cause death. The Law
Reform Commission, although it recommended the continued criminal
prohibition of both euthanasia and assisted suicide, stated, at p. 70 of
the Working Paper, that a doctor should never refuse palliative care to
a terminally ill person only because it may hasten death. In my view,
distinctions based upon intent are important, and in fact form the basis
of our criminal law. While factually the distinction may, at times, be
difficult to draw, legally it is clear."
Unfortunately it is not clear whether Sopinka J. would have included Type
Two PSsANH in his definition of "palliative care" (he appears to only
be contemplating the potentially life-shortening effect of drugs, not the
withholding of hydration and nutrition; as noted by Smith J. in Carter
(Trial), "[t]he majority in Rodriguez did not refer to palliative sedation"1 2 ).
However, the logic of the passage suggests that, if he had turned his mind
to it, he would have concluded that Type Two PSsANH is legal.
More recently, Smith J. noted in Carter (Trial):
11. Rodriguezv British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519, 107 DLR (4th) 342 at para
57 [Rodriguez]. The position put forward by Sopinka J. has been criticized. See, for example, Jocelyn
Downie, Dying Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), at p 93-94, 139-140.
12. Carter (Trial), supra note 9 at para 332.
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So far as I am aware, palliative or terminal sedation has not been the
subject of judicial consideration in Canada. It seems, however, to be a
practice that may fall within the principles already described with regard
to informed consent and potentially life-shortening symptom relief. 3
However, Justice Smith's choice of language, in particular her use of
"it seems" and "may fall," reflects and reinforces the ambiguity about
the legality of Type Two PSsANH. That ambiguity leaves health care
providers contemplating providing Type Two PSsANH in the shadow of
potential criminal liability and leaves patients without a strong foundation
upon which to base a request for access.
Looking deeper into Smith J.'s reasons does not provide greater clarity
or certainty. Justice Smith certainly had before her the fact that "palliative
or terminal sedation" may shorten life. She reported that both the
plaintiffs1 4 and the defendants" accepted that deep and continuous sedation
combined with the withholding or withdrawal of artificial hydration and
nutrition can be "death-hastening." She noted, without disagreeing with
the submission, that the Crown had submitted, "the law permits death-
hastening acts through refusal or withdrawal of treatment, or declining
nutrition and hydration while under palliative sedation.1 6 She might be
taken as implying that PSsANH is a form of suicide and so is not illegal.1 7
She might also be taken as implying that PSsANH is legal for individuals
even when death is not imminent. " However, none of this is sufficient to
have confidence in drawing conclusions regarding the legal status of Type
Two PSsANH.
On the appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada simply stated "The law
allows people in this situation [with a grievous and irremediable condition]
to request palliative sedation...."1 9 Again, this provides no guidance on
the boundaries of permissibility (for example, it is not clear whether the
Supreme Court even turned its mind to the different types of palliative
sedation or the range of different circumstances in which it might be
sought).
The Quebec legislation directly addresses the issue of what it calls
"continuous palliative sedation," understanding it narrowly as deep
13. Ibid at para 226.
14. Ibid at para 321.
15. Ibid at para 1075.
16. Ibid at para 1075.
17. Ibid at para 1076.
18. Ibid at para 1159. For example, Gloria Taylor and Elayne Shapray were not imminently dying
and yet Smith J. implies that they could legally have access to PSsANH.
19. Carter 2015, supra note 1 at para 66.
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and continuous sedation (with no reference to hydration and nutrition),
restricting it to "end-of-life" patients, establishing the requirement of
consent (from the patient or substitute decision-maker), and ensuring
oversight through the establishment of a reporting system.20 However,
continuous palliative sedation is defined as part of "palliative care,"
and "palliative care" is defined as "care delivered.. .without delaying or
hastening death." This suggests that Type Two PSsANH would not be
legal under the Quebec legislation as, by definition, it may hasten death.
The federal MAiD legislation in turn did not address the issue of
palliative sedation at all. Of course, this all leaves many details of the
legal status of palliative sedation woefully underdeveloped. Furthermore,
in this state of uncertainty, there is reason to be concerned that some
patients are being denied PSsANH on contestable grounds. Consider the
"Framework for Continuous Palliative Sedation Therapy in Canada."2 1
While the framework for continuous palliative sedation therapy (CPST)
is a commendable effort to develop and advance guidance in the absence
of clear law, it would be problematic to leave the uncertainties described
above to be resolved through this framework. For example, it requires
that "all other reasonable alternatives have failed or were reasonably
rejected"22 and that "there should be consensus that the harm of suffering
warrants the harm of reduced consciousness."23 Contrast these conditions
with the criteria for access to MAiD established in the federal legislation-
the framework criteria are more restrictive. Under the federal legislation,
there is no reasonableness standard for the rejection of treatments; the
assessment of suffering is for the patient alone and is not subject to
"consensus."2 On what basis could being more restrictive of access to
Types One and Two PSiANH than to MAiD be justified? In addition,
while the Framework says, "decisions regarding CPST should conform to
the national, provincial and institutional policies for decisionmaking and
informed consent in law and medical ethics,"25 itthen requires "consensus"
among the patient, family, and team. A consensus requirement is not
consistent with the law on informed consent. Finally, there is reason to be
20. An Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, supra note 2.
21. Mervyn M Dean et al, "Framework for Continuous Palliative Sedation Therapy in Canada"
(2012) 15:8 J Palliative Medicine 870 [Framework].
22. Framework, supra note 21 at 872.
23. Ibid at 871.
24. MAiD legislation, supra note 3, at s 241.2(2).
25. Framework, supra note 21 at 872.
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concerned that some patients are being given PSsANH without their or
their substitute decision-maker's free and informed consent.2 6
Fortunately, there is a way to respond to this state of affairs. The
federal government could amend the Criminal Code27 to make it clear that:
(1) the first two types of PSsANH are not contrary to the Criminal Code,
(2) access should not be restricted by the type of suffering or condition of
the patient, and (3) like any medical treatment, free and informed consent
from the patient or patient's substitute decision maker where the patient
does not have capacity to make the decision is necessary and sufficient. To
that end, the following could be added to the Criminal Code:
"palliative sedation" means the intentional administration of deep and
continuous sedation combined with the withholding or withdrawal
of artificial hydration and nutrition where the purpose is to alleviate
suffering where this will not, or may but is not certain to, shorten the life
of the person.28
No physician, other health care provider acting under the direction of
a physician, or nurse practitioner is guilty of an offence under this Act
where the physician, other health care provider acting under the direction
of a physician, or nurse practitioner provides palliative sedation to a
patient with a valid consent from the patient (if competent or through
a valid advance directive if incompetent) or the patient's statutory
substitute decision-maker (if incompetent and without a valid advance
directive).
This Criminal Code amendment would provide clarity and certainty-
enabling understanding and respect for the law-as well as access to
much-needed symptom relief for patients.
In addition, all institutions in which the first two types of PSsANH are
provided could be encouraged to conduct an audit of practice to ensure
that they are following best practices (and the Criminal Code amended as
above), including getting free and informed consent from the patient or
patient's substitute decision-maker.
Discussion of these and other suggestions for law reform is needed.
2. Type three PSIANH
The law on the third type of PSiANH is absolutely unsettled. Imagine
a situation in which a patient is diagnosed with Amyotrophic Lateral
26. E.g., M McKinnon et al, "Practice and Documentation of Palliative Sedation: A Quality
Improvement Initiative" (2014) 21:2 Current Oncology, 100 at 102.
27. RSC 1985, c C-46.
28. Note that this definition does not include Type Three PSsANH. A discussion of what should be
done for that type follows below.
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Sclerosis, a lethal degenerative neurological disorder. She lives with it
for some while but, six months before her death is expected, she asks to
be deeply sedated (thereby creating the need for artificial hydration and
nutrition) and refuses all artificial hydration and nutrition. The cause of
her death would be the lack of hydration and nutrition. Can a physician
respect her wishes without facing criminal liability? If so, what eligibility
criteria and procedural safeguards apply? What if the patient requested
PS§ANH through an advance directive completed long before any
particular diagnosis or commencement of suffering?
There is no legislation or case law directly on point to provide clear
answers to these questions. As noted in the earlier discussion of Type Two
PS§ANH, Smith J. in Carter (Trial) did contemplate "death-hastening"
palliative sedation. She noted, without disagreeing with the submission,
that the Crown had submitted that death-hastening acts are legal,2 9 and her
comments could be taken to imply Type Three PS§ANH is legal. However,
there is no clarity or certainty, and no discussion of the boundaries of
permissibility (in particular, how near to death the patient must be, the
nature of the suffering, etc.). We are therefore left wondering whether it
is legal for a patient whose life has become intolerable to her but whose
medical condition is not likely to cause her death for many years to access
to Type Three PSsANH.
As noted earlier, there is no evidence that the Supreme Court of Canada
appreciated the three types of palliative sedation, most particularly, that it
even knew of the existence of this third type.
The only national framework for palliative sedation takes the position
that "CPST is indicated only for refractory and intolerable suffering,
usually in the last 2 weeks of life."3 0 The Framework acknowledges, "the
longer the anticipated time before death the greater the ethical challenges
and the more controversial the procedure, especially regarding decisions
around nutrition and hydration during sedation."3 1 This means that the
third type of PS§ANH could be permissible under the Framework. It would
be "unusual" outside of two weeks. But PS§ANH with a life-expectancy
beyond two weeks is not prohibited. And yet, the Framework does not
tell health care providers how to determine when cases of the third type
of PS§ANH, while unusual, are nonetheless permitted.3 2 Furthermore, the
29. Carter (Trial), supra note 9 at para 1075.
30. Framework, supra note 21 at 871.
31. Ibid at 871.
32. Ibid.
And Miles to Go Before I Sleep: The Future of 421
End-of-Life Law and Policy in Canada
Framework has no authority: it is the result of a special task force of the
Canadian Society for Palliative Care Physicians.
We need to address this legal lacuna. We need to wrestle with at
least three very serious questions. First, is Type Three PSsANH legally
permitted under the current law? To answer this, we must debate the
application of first principles of criminal law to PSsANH (in particular,
intention and causation). Second, should Type Three PSsANH be legally
permitted? Third, if permitted at all, how should Type Three PSsANH be
regulated? Through reform to the Criminal Code? Through guidelines
for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion issued by provincial/territorial
Attorneys General or Directors of Public Prosecutions?
Clear guidance is obviously needed on Type Three PSsANH so that
patients receive adequate symptom control (i.e., those who should have
access, do), the vulnerable are protected (i.e, those who should not have
access, do not), and patients who qualify for MAiD but would prefer to die
through PSsANH (rather than through ingesting or receiving an injection
of a lethal medication) can do so. Given the current lack of clarity in and
guidance from the law, we cannot be confident that any of these objectives
are being met.
II. Advance directives for the withholding and withdrawal of oral
hydration and nutrition
Twenty-six years ago, the right to refuse potentially life-sustaining
treatment first came before the courts in Canada.3 3 It is now very clear
that a refusal of potentially life-sustaining treatment made by a competent
individual or their substitute decision-maker must be respected by health
care providers. As noted by Sopinka J. in Rodriguez,
Canadian courts have recognized a common law right of patients to
refuse consent to medical treatment, or to demand that treatment, once
commenced, be withdrawn or discontinued (Ciarlariello v. Schacter,
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 119). This right has been specifically recognized to exist
even if the withdrawal from or refusal of treatment may result in death
(Nancy B. v. H6tel-Dieu de Qubbec (1992), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (Que.
S.C.); and Malette v. Shulman (1990), 72 O.R. (2d) 417 (C.A.)). 34
However, a couple of years ago a twist on the issue of withholding or
withdrawing treatment was brought forward in the case of Margot
33. Malette v Shulman (1990), 72 OR (2d) 417, [1990] OJ No 450 (CA); Nancy B v Hotel Dieu de
Quebec (1992), 86 DLR (4th) 385, [1992] RJQ 361 (Que SC); Fleming vReid (1991), 4 OR (3d) 74,
[1991] OJ No 1083 (CA).
34. Rodriguez, supra note 11 at para 41.
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Bentley.3 5 Given the anticipated wave of dementia in coming years,'3 6 this
issue is likely to take on increased significance.
Margot Bentley was a woman with advanced Alzheimer's Disease.
When she was well she completed an advance directive, that indicated
the point at which she wished many things, including "nourishment and
liquids" to be withheld or withdrawn. Once she reached that point, her
substitute decision-maker directed the facility she lived in now to stop
spoon-feeding her. However, this facility insisted on continuing to feed
Margot and her family was unsuccessful at stopping the facility in court.3 7
So Margot continued to be fed for years (she died in November 2016).
While there are disagreements in the Bentley case about various
matters (e.g., was there another advance directive that expressed conflicting
wishes? Was Margot competent? Was Margot consenting to being fed by
opening her mouth when the spoon was tapped against her lip?), the case
unquestionably raises a significant issue of end-of-life law and policy.
The law is clear around refusing artificial hydration and nutrition through
advance directives, but it is not so clear around refusing oral hydration and
nutrition through advance directives. What should happen when a valid
advance directive clearly states that, should the patient get into a particular
condition, she does not want even food and water by mouth? Must a health
care team respect that refusal? Might a health care provider who respects
the refusal find themselves facing criminal liability for failing to "provide
necessaries of life"? 38
Some provinces have already addressed this issue in legislation. For
example, the Nova Scotia Personal Directives Act provides:
"personal care" includes, but is not limited to, health care, nutrition,
hydration, shelter, residence, clothing, hygiene, safety, comfort,
recreation, social activities, support services and any other personal
matter that is prescribed by the regulations; 39
Following an advance directive refusing oral nutrition and hydration
would therefore be required in Nova Scotia under the Personal Directives
35. 2015 BCCA 91, [2015] 6 WWR 252 [Bentley 2015]; see also Thaddeus Pope, "Decision-Making:
At the End of Life and the Provision of Pretreatment Advice" (2015) 12:3 J Bioethical Inquiry 389.
36. J Downie & G Lloyd-Smith, "Assisted Dying for Individuals with Dementia: Challenges for
Translating Ethical Positions into Law," in Michael Cholbi & Jukka Varelius, eds, New Directions in
the Ethics ofAssisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 1st ed, (New York: Springer International Publishing,
2015) 97 at 100-101.
37. Bentley v. Maplewood Seniors Care Society, 2014 BCSC 165, [2014] 7 WWR 808; Bentley
2015, supra note 35.
38. Criminal Code, supra note 27, s 215.
39. PersonalDirectivesAct, SNS 2008, c 8, s 2(1) (emphasis added).
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Act and would not violate the Criminal Code as the health care provider
would have a "lawful excuse" for not providing the necessaries of life.
Again, as a starting contribution to the policy debate needed to address
this issue, I would argue that those provinces and territories lacking
provisions similar to those found in Nova Scotia4 o need to reform their
legislation to: (1) make the answer clear; and, specifically, (2) make it
clear that health care providers must respect refusals of oral hydration and
nutrition. This could be achieved through the inclusion of the following
text in, for example, health care consent legislation:
"potentially life-sustaining care" means care that has the potential to
sustain the life of a person including, but not limited to, health care and
oral and artificial hydration and nutrition;
"withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining care" means intentionally
ceasing care that has the potential to sustain a persons' life;
"withholding of potentially life-sustaining care" means intentionally
refraining from commencing care that has the potential to sustain a
person's life.
Except as otherwise provided by law, a capable patient may, at any time,
refuse consent to potentially life-sustaining care or withdraw consent to
such care. In the case of an incapable patient, the substitute decision-
maker appointed under the [provincial/territorial advance directives
legislation and consent legislation] may also refuse to authorize
potentially life-sustaining care or withdraw authorization of such care.
A free and informed refusal of consent or authorization made by an
individual with legal decision-making authority must be respected.
It could also be achieved through the inclusion of the following text in
advance directives legislation, as in Nova Scotia:
3 (1) A person with capacity may make a personal directive
(a) setting out instructions or an expression of the maker's values, beliefs
and wishes about future personal-care decisions to be made on his or her
behalf....
40. Alberta: Personal Directives Act, RSA 2000, c P-6, s 1(f); British Columbia: Health Care
(Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act, RSBC 1996, c 181, s 1 & 19.2; Manitoba: The Health
Care Directives Act, CCSM c H27, s 1; New Brunswick: Infirm Persons Act, RSNB 1973, c 1-8,
s 40(1); Northwest Territories: Personal Directives Act, SNWT 2005, c 16, si; Ontario: Substitute
Decisions Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 30, s.46(1), Health Care Consent Act, 1996, SO 1996, c 2, s 2(1);
Prince Edward Island: Consent to Treatment and Health Care DirectivesAct, RSPEI 1988, c C-17.2,
s 2(m)&(p); Quebec: Civil Code of Quebec, CQLR c C-1991, s 11, 12 & 2166; Saskatchewan: The
Health Care Directives and Substitute Health Care Decision Makers Act, SS 1997, c H-0.001, s 2(1)
(d) & (h); Yukon: Care ConsentAct, SY 2003, c 21, s 1.
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18(3) A health-care provider shall follow
(b) where there is no delegate, the instructions or an expression of
the maker's wishes contained in a personal directive."
III. Unilateral withholding or withdrawal ofpotentially life-
sustaining treatment
Fortunately, as noted above, we have left behind the practice of
keeping people alive against their express wishes. If a competent
patient is ventilator-dependent and paralyzed in bed, his request to
remove the ventilator must be respected. But what if a patient has
sustained a traumatic brain injury, is now incompetent, and her family
want treatment continued while the health care team have decided that
treatment would be what they characterize as "futile"? Or what if a
competent patient has advanced cancer and wants all interventions
for a long enough window to see whether some traditional medicines
might work, but the doctors want to put a Do Not Attempt Resuscitation
Order on his chart?
These questions are not speculative in a pejorative sense. A recent
Canadian study revealed a disturbing discordance between written
orders regarding treatment and patients' expressed preferences for end-
of-life care.4 2 In addition, a significant number of conflicts between
health care teams and patients' substitute decision makers have ended
up in court4 3 and in the media.4
41. Personal Directives Act, supra note 39.
42. Daren K Heyland et al, "The Prevalence of Medical Error Related to End-of-Life
Communication in Canadian Hospitals: Results of a Multicentre Observational Study" (2015)
BMJ Quality & Safety, DOI: 10.1136/bmjqs-2015-004567, online: < http://qualitysafety.bmj.
com/content/early/2015/11/08/bmjqs-20 15-004567.full.pdf>.
43. See, e.g., cases summarized in Jocelyn Downie & Karen McEwen, "The Manitoba
College of Physicians and Surgeons Position Statement on Withholding and Withdrawal of Life-
Sustaining Treatment (2008): Three Problems and a Solution" (2009) 17 HealthLJ 115.
44. See, e.g., Robert Cribb, "Sunnybrook Case Raises Question of Who Decides Life Support,"
Toronto Star (28 September 2012), online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2012/09/28/
sunnybrook case raises question of whodecideslife_support.html>; John Gillis, "Family
Wants Court to Keep Sick Man Alive," The Chronicle Herald (17 November 2006); Tom
Blackwell, "Who Says Doctors Know Best: Families Do Not Have Final Say in Pulling Plug,"
The National Post (11 December 2006); Robert Cribb, "Family Sues Physician, Toronto Hospital
over No-Resuscitation Order," The Toronto Star (25 March 2015), online: <https://www.thestar.
com/news/gta/20 15/03/2 5/family-sues-physician-toronto-hospital-over-no-resuscitation-order.
html>; Robert Cribb, "Lawsuit Could Set Precedent About End-Of-Life Decisions," The Toronto
Star (4 September 2010), online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2010/09/04/lawsuit-could_
set_precedent aboutendoflife decisions.html>.
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Unfortunately, the legal status ofunilateral withholding and withdrawal
of potentially life-sustaining treatment is profoundly unsettled in Canada.
As noted by Smith J. in Carter (Trial):
The law makes clear that consent is a sufficient condition for the
withdrawal or withholding of treatment. But is consent also a necessary
condition? Whether a physician or hospital can legally withhold or
withdraw potentially life-sustaining treatment without the consent of
either the patient or the patient's substituted decision-maker, is currently
under much debate.
In some decisions, Canadian courts have held that it is not appropriate
for a court to interfere with medical practitioners acting unilaterally in
the best interests of a patient: for example, Child and Family Services of
Manitoba v. R.L. (1997), 1997 CanLII 3742 (MB CA), 154 D.L.R. (4th)
409 (Man. C.A.); and Re: J.H. V Estate, 2008 ABQB 250 (CanLII).
More commonly, however, courts faced with such issues have concluded
that the law in Canada is not settled: for example, Sawatzky v. Riverview
Health Centre Inc. (1998), 167 D.L.R. (4th) 359 (Man. Q.B.); Jin
v. Calgary Health Region, 2007 ABQB 593 (CanLII); Golubchuk v.
Salvation Army Grace General Hospital, 2008 MBQB 49 (CanLII);
and Rotaru v. Vancouver General Hospital Intensive Care Unit, 2008
BCSC 318 (CanLII).45
No doubt hoping that clarification of the law would be forthcoming, Smith
J. noted that this issue was before the Supreme Court of Canada in Rasouli
v SunnybrookHealth Sciences Centre.46 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
decision provided considerable (albeit not perfect) clarity for those who
live in Ontario, but not much for those of us in the rest of Canada.
In Ontario, thanks to some unique provisions in theirhealth care consent
legislation,4 7 the existence of a Consent and Capacity Board (CCB),4"
and the fact that the majority in the Supreme Court based its decision in
Rasouli on statutory interpretation of the Ontario legislation and not on the
common law, 4 9 the legal status of unilateral withholding and withdrawal
of potentially life-sustaining treatment is somewhat clear (physicians do
not have the authority to unilaterally withdraw potentially life-sustaining
45. Carter (Trial), supra note 9 at paras 227-229.
46. Rasouli (Litigation Guardian of v Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre, 2013 SCC 53, [2013] 3
SCR 341 [Rasouli].
47. See Health Care ConsentAct, SO 1996, c 2, Schedule A, s 2(1) "Plan of treatment" means a plan
that.. provides for the administration to the person of various treatments or courses of treatment and
may, in addition, provide for the withholding or withdrawal of treatment in light of the person's current
health condition"
48. Consent and Capacity Board, online: <http://www.ccboard.onca/scripts/english/index.asp>.
49. Rasouli, supra note 46.
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treatment, but rather must go to the CCB to seek authorization to do so
when the team believes treatment should not be provided and the patient's
substitute decision-maker believes that it should).
At first blush, it might seem like the issue of unilateral withholding
and withdrawal has, as in Ontario, been somewhat clarified for Yukon;
because of apparent similarities between the Ontario and Yukon statutes,
it might seem like the reasoning in Rasouli could be extended to Yukon.
Similar (but not identical) to Ontario, the Yukon legislation includes "the
withholding or withdrawal of health care" in its definition of "care plan"
and Yukon has a Care and Consent Board. However, Yukon does not
include "care plan""o within its definition of "health care.""1 The legislation
requires consent to "care" and "care" is defined as "(a) health care, (b)
admission to live in a care facility, and (c) personal assistance services."52
Therefore, unlike Ontario, there is arguably no statutory requirement for
consent to the withholding or withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining
treatment (although, like the rest of country, there may still be a common
law requirement for consent). Furthermore, even if "care plan" was
read into "health care" and a requirement of consent to withholding and
withdrawal of treatment established, Yukon does not then end up with
the same clarity as Ontario. Unlike in Ontario, health care providers can
only seek a decision from the Care and Capacity Board respecting "major
health care" (it is all treatment in Ontario). Major health care is defined in
s. 1 of the Care Consent Act as:
(a) major surgery,
(b) any treatment involving a general anesthetic,
(c) major diagnostic or investigative procedures, or
(d) any health care designated by the regulations as major health
care....
It is further defined in the regulations as:
(a) radiation therapy;
(b) intravenous chemotherapy;
(c) peritoneal and kidney dialysis;
(d) abortions under section 9;
(e) electroconvulsive therapy under section 10;
(f) removal of tissue under section 11;
(g) experimental health care under section 12;
50. Care ConsentAct, supra note 40, Schedule B.
51. Ibid, s 1.
52. Ibid.
And Miles to Go Before I Sleep: The Future of 427
End-of-Life Law and Policy in Canada
(h) medical research under section 13;
(i) laser surgery.5 3
Much contested potentially life-sustaining treatment will not qualify as
"major health care" so health care providers will not have access to the
Care and Capacity Board to resolve disagreements about such care. In
these instances, if consent to withholding and withdrawal is required,
health care providers would have to go to court under the Adult Protection
and Decision Making Act 4 to seek to have the substitute decision-maker
displaced through the appointment of a guardian (presumably on the
grounds that the substitute decision-maker is not acting according to their
duties under section 20 of the Care Consent Act.)
As the Supreme Court declined to settle the common law status of
unilateral withholding and withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining
treatment through its decision in Rasouli, most of the country remains mired
in a controversial and corrosive state of confusion. We need provincial and
territorial legislatures to step up, clarify the law, and establish efficient
and affordable processes for the resolution of conflicts. Barring that, more
litigation will be necessary.
Unfortunately, unilateral withholding and withdrawing of treatment
is one of the most controversial issues facing end-of-life law and policy
in the future." Achieving the necessary law reform will not be easy as
the issue implicates the patients' and their families' beliefs and values,
as well as the beliefs and values of health care providers.5 6 Costs to the
health care system are also implicated. Autonomy, conscience, culture,
and professional judgement along with economics can all come together
in a singularly toxic clash. How the competing rights and interests will be
reconciled is unclear; that they need to be reconciled is very clear.
IV. Determination ofdeath
It might seem odd to suggest that the future of end-of-life law and policy
should include a discussion of the issue of the determination of death. This
issue was discussed in depth a number of decades ago and then largely
subsided with the broad acceptance in practice of using brain death criteria
53. Care Consent Regulation, YOIC 2005/80, 29 April 2005.
54. SY 2003, c 21, SchA.
55. See, e.g., James Downar, Michael Warner & Robert Sibbald, "Mandate to obtain consent for
withholding nonbeneficial cardiopulmonary resuscitation is misguided" (2016) 188:4 CMAJ 245;
Hilary Young, "Why Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatment Should Not Require 'Rasouli'Consent"
(2012) 6:2 McGill JL & Health 54.
56. J Downie, L Willmott & BP White, "Next Up: A Proposal for Values-Based Law Reform on
Unilateral Withholding and Withdrawal of Potentially Life-Sustaining Treatment" [forthcoming
Alberta Law Review].
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for the determination of death. However, it needs to be revisited for at least
two reasons.
First, there is a desperate need fororgans fortransplantation and there are
some patients who do not progress to brain death while on cardiopulmonary
support. Some have suggested (and indeed put into practice) that physicians
should be allowed to turn off the artificial supports, wait 2, 5, 10, or 20
minutes, and, if the heart does not function, declare the person dead and
then have the transplant team harvest the organs." This practice is known
as "controlled Donation After Cardiocirculatory Death (DCD)." A number
of authors have raised concerns with the practice of DCD in Canada, both
in terms of the content of the guidelines that established a five-minute wait
period and the process of arriving at the guidelines." Indeed there have
been calls for a moratorium on the practice.59
Second, there are reasons to be concerned about actual or perceived
inaccurate determinations of death. A recent study of hospitals in the
United States concluded that "[h]ospital policies in the Unites States for
the determination of brain death are still widely variable and not fully
congruent with contemporary practice parameters."60 While this is an
American study, there is no reason to presume Canadian results would be
any better. Furthermore, we are now seeing cases in which the patient is
declared brain dead by physicians, but the families dispute the declaration.
While the high profile cases have been in the United States (e.g., Jahi
McMath), there is some anecdotal evidence of such cases in Canada. One
57. Institute of Medicine, Non-Heart-Beating Organ Transplantation:Medical and Ethical Issues in
Procurement (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1997); University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center. UPMC Policy for the Management of Terminally Ill Patients Who May Become Organ
Donors After Death (Pittsburgh, Penn: University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 1992); G Kootstra,
"Statements on Non-Hean-Beating Donor Programs" (1995) 27:5 Transplantation Proceedings 2965;
Margareta A Sanner, "Two Perspectives on Organ Donation: Experiences of Potential Donor Families
and Intensive Care Physicians of the Same Event" (2007) 22:4 J Critical Care 296.
58. J Downie et al, "Eligibility for Organ Donation: a Medico-Legal Perspective on Defining and
Determining Death" (2009) 56:11 Can J Anesthesia 851 [Downie et al, 2009]; Jacquelyn Shaw "A
Death-Defying Leap: Section 7 Charter Implications of the Canadian Council for Donation and
Transplantation's Guidelines for the Neurological Determination of Death" (2012) 6:1 McGill JL &
Health 41. See also CBC The Fifth Estate, "Dead Enough?" (21 March 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca/
fifth/episodes/2013-2014/dead-enough>.
59. AR Joffe et al, "Donation after Cardiocirculatory Death: A Call for a Moratorium Pending Full
Public Disclosure and Fully Informed Consent" (2011) 6:1 Philosophy, Ethics, & Humanities in
Medicine 17.
60. David Greer et al, "Variability of Brain Death Policies in the United States" (2016) 73:2 JAMA
Neurology 213. Greer et al do note that "no legitimate reports of patients regaining any brain function
after being declared brain dead according to the 1995 AAN guidelines have surfaced." Or course, this
is not surprising given the cessation of treatment, including artificial support for cardiac function, that
almost always follows the determination of brain death. They do not acknowledge the controversy
over the declaration of death of Jahi McMath.
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significant concern arising from these cases is that the public may lose
faith in the system and, if they do, the willingness to be organ donors will
drop. Then the number of organs available for transplantation will drop
and lives will be lost.
What is needed is a significant health law and policy intervention
on the legal definition, criteria, and tests for the determination of death;
robust consultation of experts and other stakeholders; legal clarification;
education; and enforcement. This initiative need not start from scratch.
Yet again, as a starting contribution to the policy debate needed to address
this issue, I would argue that provinces and territories should embrace the
following approach to the determination of death:
(1) Death is defined as the irreversible cessation of the functioning of the
organism as a whole. (2) The criterion for the determination of death is
the irreversible loss of the brain's capacity to control and coordinate the
organism's critical functions. (3) Irreversible is defined as not physically
possible to reverse without violating the law on consent. (4) The
fulfillment of the criterion may be demonstrated by one or more medical
tests (including neurological and cardiopulmonary). Specific tests are to
be established by the medical profession.6 '
This could be achieved through the inclusion of the following text in organ
donation legislation, as in Nova Scotia:
"death" means the irreversible cessation of the functioning of the
organism as a whole as determined by the ineversible loss of the brain's
ability to control and co-ordinate all of the organism's critical functions;
"irreversible" means not physically possible to reverse without violating
consent law;6 2
The full argument for that legislative approach has been published
elsewhere 63 What is needed now is a multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral
engagement with that argument as well as the arguments in support of
and against alternative approaches. Greater clarity and certainty could
then be achieved through the adoption of provisions in either organ
donation legislation or interpretation acts (surprisingly, most provinces
and territories do not have a statutory definition of death).6 4 Following on
from this, rigorous education materials should be produced and education
61. Downie et al, 2009, supra note 58.
62. Human Organ and Tissue Donation Act, SNS 2010, c 36, s 2 (not yet in force).
63. Downie et al, 2009, supra note 58.
64. Prince Edward Island, Manitoba, and New Brunswick have a statutory definition of death,
while Quebec, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Ontario,
Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, and Yukon do not.
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programs offered to ensure that physicians understand the legal definition
of death and understand the criteria for the legal determination of death
and the appropriate tests to assess whether the criteria have been met.
It should also be noted here that, at least in part as a result ofthe need for
organs for transplantation, we may again be confronted with the argument
that we should get rid of the dead donor rule-that is, the rule that says
that physicians cannot remove organs from a person (even with consent)
until after they are dead. 65 Individuals will soon be able to consent to their
own death (MAiD). We have a desperate need for organs for life-saving
transplantation. And the legal fiction that there is a moment of death (as
opposed to a process of dying and decomposition) is struggling under its
own weight as science advances. As a result of these facts, pressure may
well mount to abandon the dead donor rule. Put concretely, for example,
why can I not consent to the removal of my organs while I am in a persistent
vegetative state? This too is a question that will require our considerable
attention in the near future.
Conclusion
The victory in Carter 2015 and the passage of the federal and Quebec
MAiD legislation has surely transformed the field of end-of-life law and
policy in Canada and the implementation of the legislation will surely
benefit many Canadians.6 6 But there is still much more work to be done.
We can and should now tackle these other issues that have long lived in the
shadows of assisted dying.
65. Downie et al, 2009, supra note 58.
66. It must be noted here that an argument can be made that the federal MAiD legislation does not
benefit as many Canadians as it should; it is too restrictive and is not consistent with the Charter.
Indeed, a court challenge has already been launched to make just this argument; see, e.g., Lamb, supra
note 6. This case will no doubt end up in front of the Supreme Court of Canada in the not-too-distant
future.
